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26  
**EXCISE**

COURSE OF ACTION  
IF IL-28s ARE NOT REMOVED AND  
NO GROUND INSPECTION

I. PROBLEM:

To examine alternative courses of action under the following circumstances:

1. Soviets have removed 42 missiles but rumors continue to persist that some such weapons have been concealed in caves or elsewhere in Cuba.
2. No agreement on removal of the IL-28s.
3. No agreement on ground inspection in Cuba.

Comment:

Present outlook is that within the next few days the Soviets will announce that, all missiles having been removed and their part of the bargain thus fulfilled, the United States should promptly lift its quarantine and incorporate the guarantee of itself and other CAS states against invasion of Cuba in a formal document. Soviets will probably call for a Security Council meeting to this end. Soviets will probably seek to link ground inspection in Cuba to our "guarantee", insisting that they be negotiated with Cuba so that there is "mutual inspection".

II. COURSES OF ACTION:

A. Withhold our guarantees.

Comment: We must in any event do this, taking the position that our commitment against invasion is predicated on Soviet performance

under

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by ABH/wh DATE 2/10/80 ~~TOP SECRET~~

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under the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding.

3. Reinstate enforcement of the quarantine, extending list to POL.

Comment:

This would constitute very effective pressure on Castro. It would have strong support among most OAS states. Much diplomatic preparation would be required among most other states. Soviets would probably charge bad faith on our part. Question is whether Soviets would again acquiesce in quarantine without seeking to take reprisal action elsewhere.

C. Seek have all non-bloc tankers withdrawn from Cuban trade, using threat of alternative being imposition by us of quarantine on POL.

Comment:

If successful (much diplomatic preparation would be needed), immediate effect would be approximately 50 percent reduction in POL available to Cuba. Soviets could in time adjust to situation and restore supply but at considerably increased cost to themselves.

D. Increase aerial surveillance, particularly low level.

Comment:

We would publicly justify as necessity arising from absence of ground inspection and necessity for obtaining warning of any offensive action by IL-28s. Continued low level overflights could have some adverse internal political effects on Castro regime and thus constitute considerable pressure on him to come to some agreement.

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